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THE SUPREME COURT’S SURPRISING AND
STRATEGIC RESPONSE TO THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
Michael Selmi*

INTRODUCTION
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“CRA”) sought to change the
employment discrimination landscape. The CRA overturned or
repudiated eight Supreme Court decisions that had narrowed the
scope of Title VII in a way that Congress determined was
inconsistent with the broad purpose of eradicating employment
1
discrimination. Relatedly, the CRA transformed Title VII from an
equitable relief statute—under which attorneys were most
commonly compensated through attorney fee petitions—to a tortlike statute that allows for jury trials and damages for claims
relating to intentional discrimination. The CRA also marked the
most comprehensive amendment to the original Civil Rights Act;
although Title VII had been amended several times previously, the
2
CRA was, by far, the most substantial amendment then or now.
* Samuel Tyler Research Professor of Law, George Washington
University Law School. An earlier version of this Article was presented at a
Symposium held at Wake Forest University School of Law, where I benefitted
from the comments and conversations I had at the time. Particular thanks to
Professor Wendy Parker for the invitation to participate and for very helpful
suggestions.
1. The statute overturned portions of or the entire decisions in eight cases.
See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (extraterritorial
application of Title VII), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077; W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499
U.S. 83 (1991) (expert witness fees), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of
1991 § 113; Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (§ 1981),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 101(b); Lorance v. AT&T
Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (seniority system), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991 § 112; Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (white employees
allowed to challenge affirmative action consent decrees), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 108; Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989) (disparate impact), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105;
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (mixed motives), superseded
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a); Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S.
310 (1986) (government’s immunity from interest), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991 § 114.
2. Prior to the passage of the CRA, Title VII had been amended twice. In
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In this Article, I will explore the effect the CRA has had on
employment discrimination litigation, primarily in the Supreme
Court, but I will also glance toward litigation in the lower courts.
Based on a review of the Title VII cases and other related cases the
3
Court has decided over the last twenty years, it appears that the
CRA had a meaningful restraining effect on the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence. Since the CRA was passed, the Court has generally,
though by no means always, been more supportive of plaintiffs’ Title
VII claims than it had been in the years immediately preceding the
CRA.
There is, however, an important caveat: in the most
ideological cases, or those cases that might have the most dramatic
effect on litigation, the Court has remained decidedly pro-defendant.
In other words, in the most meaningful cases, plaintiffs continue to
encounter a hostile Supreme Court. It also appears that the
changes wrought by the CRA did not substantially improve
outcomes for plaintiffs, though there was, especially in the early
years, a dramatic increase in filings. On the whole, plaintiffs have
fared only marginally better on the merits, and employment
discrimination cases continue to be more difficult to win than most
other comparable civil cases.
This Article will proceed in two primary parts. The first Part
will explore the cases that preceded the CRA and introduce the
positive political theory framework through which I want to analyze
the Court’s response. Positive political theory sees the relationship
between the judicial, legislative, and executive branches as a
political game designed to assert preferences; several scholars have
assessed the origins of the CRA against the positive political theory
4
framework. The second Part of the Article will go beyond those
1972, Title VII was amended to apply the statute to public employers (and to
address other smaller issues), and in 1978, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
was passed to amend Title VII so that discrimination based on pregnancy would
be considered part of sex discrimination. See ROY L. BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL
RIGHTS LITIGATION 402–03 (3d ed. 2005).
3. In this Article, I am concentrating on Title VII, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and § 1981, while consciously excluding cases
involving the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The ADA was passed in
1990 and the Supreme Court has generally interpreted it very narrowly—so
narrowly, in fact, that Congress recently passed a statute to modify several of
the decisions. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122
Stat. 3553 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The 1991
Act, however, was not aimed at the ADA, and the ADA also posed unusual
interpretive issues that may have led the Court to effectively rewrite the
statute. Most of what proved to be controversial decisions were not ideologically
charged, as several of the cases were decided by seven-to-two margins. For a
discussion of the ADA and the Court’s interpretive approach, see Michael Selmi,
Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme Court
Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L. R EV.
522 (2008). Obviously, the article’s title proved a bit too cute.
4. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 385–90 (1991); William N.
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analyses to assess the Supreme Court’s response to see how the
Court has adopted a strategically sophisticated approach that has
diverged significantly from its interpretative path prior to the CRA.
I. THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
The history behind the CRA is well known and I will provide
only a cursory outline, some of which is informed by my experiences
as a staff attorney with the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights at
the time the Act was under consideration. Although I played a
rather minor monitoring role, the Lawyers’ Committee and my
direct supervisor, Rick Seymour, were heavily involved in the
drafting and negotiating of the legislation, and I later became
enmeshed in some of the early litigation interpreting the CRA.
During the 1980s, the Supreme Court took a deeply
conservative turn on issues of civil rights, particularly with respect
to employment discrimination. The Court repeatedly reached
adverse results for plaintiffs, and even in cases in which the
plaintiffs prevailed, the Court would often impose significant
5
limitations on the employment discrimination doctrine. There were
a substantial number of cases that limited the rights of plaintiffs,
but three cases decided during the 1989 term were particularly
important in prompting congressional action.
Probably the most significant departure from prior precedent
came in the case of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, in which the
6
Court severely restricted the scope of § 1981. The statute had never
been a major source of employment rights, but it was one of the
original civil rights statutes enacted during Reconstruction, and it
had a long history that the Supreme Court effectively ignored in
holding that the statute only applied to contract formation, and not
7
to acts of discrimination that occurred thereafter. Not only did the
Court limit the statute’s reach, it did so aggressively and on its own
initiative. After the case was initially briefed and argued on the
question of the statute’s scope, the Court, on its own motion, called
for reargument on whether the statute should apply to private
parties, an issue the Supreme Court had addressed in Runyon v.
8
9
McCrary just a decade earlier and that the parties had not raised.
Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President
Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 615–16 (1991).
5. A case that perhaps fits this mold best was Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust, in which the Court held that subjective employment practices could be
challenged under a disparate impact theory but also began to carve out a more
rigorous proof structure for those claims. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
487 U.S. 977, 999–1000 (1988). This project gained a critical fifth vote three
years later in Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660.
6. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 164.
7. See id.
8. 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976).
9. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 190–91 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment
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Ultimately, the Court backed away from that radical
reinterpretation, in part because of an outpouring of briefs and
10
critical public reaction, but the Court’s gesture, and its limitation
of the statutory scope, sent a signal that settled civil rights
principles were up for reconsideration.
During the same term, the Court also rewrote the law with
respect to class action settlements. In Martin v. Wilks, a group of
white firefighters sought to intervene in a case that had been
11
resolved through a consent decree many years earlier. The white
firefighters sought to challenge the remedial provisions in the
decree, which they argued impermissibly limited their opportunities
within the fire department; by a five-to-four vote, the Court
permitted the intervention, even though the firefighters had the
12
opportunity to contest the decree when it was originally entered.
This meant that, despite the Court’s frequent admonitions regarding
the importance of finality in litigation, it would often be difficult to
determine when a settlement embodied in a consent decree could be
assumed to be final and free from challenge. It also meant that a
new group of firefighters could challenge settlements that their
13
predecessors had accepted.
The Wilks case also offers important context for understanding
the Court’s direction during this time period. The consent decree at
issue in Wilks provided for preferential treatment of African
American firefighters as part of the remedies that had been
14
incorporated into the decree. The case therefore became part of the
affirmative action debate that was raging throughout much of the
in part and dissenting in part). For a discussion of the controversy surrounding
Patterson, see Donald R. Livingston & Samuel A. Marcosson, The Court at the
Crossroads: Runyon, Section 1981, and the Meaning of Precedent, 37 EMORY L.J.
949 (1988). To offer a flavor of what was at stake, the authors explain:
The NAACP Legal Defense Fund sought and obtained participation as
amicus curiae by 47 of the 50 states, the American Bar Association,
and a bipartisan group of 66 Senators and 119 Representatives. It
sought also the participation of the executive branch as amicus, but
the administration decided not to participate.
Id. at 952 n.18; see also Al Kamen, Administration Won’t Argue Rights Case:
Solicitor General Upsets Conservatives, WASH. POST, June 24, 1988, at A1. “The
Government had filed a brief on Patterson’s behalf on initial argument which
had assumed the validity of Runyon’s interpretation of § 1981, and, given that
premise, had supported Patterson’s position that racial harassment could give
rise to a valid § 1981 claim against a private employer.” Livingston &
Marcosson, supra, at 952 n.18.
10. For a discussion of the case and the public reaction, see John Hope
Franklin, The Civil Rights Act of 1866 Revisited, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1135 (1990).
11. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 758–59 (1989), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076–77.
12. Id. at 758, 761–63.
13. For a critical analysis of the case, see George M. Strickler, Jr., Martin v.
Wilks, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1557 (1990).
14. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 758.
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1980s, and was seen as integral to the Reagan administration’s
15
broader assault on civil rights and affirmative action. Even though
16
the administration had been unsuccessful in many of the cases, the
Wilks case was seen as giving a green light to efforts to dismantle
17
remedial orders. From this perspective, the Court’s decision was
fully consistent with the position espoused by the Reagan
administration—and to a lesser extent by the Bush
administration—and the Democratic Congress became concerned
18
with what the future might hold.
While Wilks and Patterson reflected the Court’s hostility toward
employment discrimination claims, the coup de grâce came with the
Court’s decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, a complicated
case in which the Court rewrote part of the disparate impact law to
place the burden of proof of the business-necessity defense squarely
19
Although the Court’s decision was seen as a
on the plaintiffs.
significant change in the law, it had also become clear that a
majority was developing on the Court in favor of eliminating the
disparate impact theory altogether—a theory the Court had created
20
Like
in common law fashion in its landmark Griggs decision.
Wilks, Wards Cove was also seen as indirectly connected with the
affirmative action debate, given that the disparate impact theory
15. For an excellent discussion of the efforts of the Reagan and Bush
administrations to dismantle affirmative action and to challenge other civil
rights orthodoxies, see Neal Devins, Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush,
68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955 (1992).
16. On two previous occasions, the Reagan administration’s efforts to
challenge existing decrees had been rebuffed. See Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 530 (1986); Firefighters Local
Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 583 (1984).
17. A similar phenomenon was occurring with school desegregation decrees
as the Supreme Court was loosening the standards for dismantling those
decrees. The most significant case was decided while the CRA was under
consideration.
See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991)
(establishing the standard for dissolving a desegregation decree); cf. Missouri v.
Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 50 (1990) (rejecting the district court’s assertion of power
to raise taxes to fund plan implementation).
18. Prior to the 1988 term, the Court had vacillated some. For example, it
approved the use of preferential hiring in a gender discrimination case, Johnson
v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), and upheld a remedial
affirmative action order in United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987), while
invalidating a preferential layoff policy in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
19. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989), superseded
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071,
1074.
20. The Griggs decision, recognizing what has come to be known as the
disparate impact theory, was not tethered to any particular statutory language
but was entirely a product of statutory interpretation. See Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971). The notion that the Supreme Court
was likely to eviscerate the disparate impact theory is based, in large part, on
the author’s recollections of the negotiations surrounding the CRA.
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had often, and mistakenly, been seen as prompting employers to
21
adopt quotas as a way of avoiding litigation. The Wards Cove case
was decided on the last day of the same term that produced the
Wilks and Patterson decisions; shortly after the term ended,
Congress began work on what was then dubbed the Civil Rights Act
22
of 1990.
While the three cases discussed above played the strongest role
in motivating Congress to act, the Court issued a number of other
controversial decisions on smaller issues, all of which made it more
difficult for discrimination plaintiffs to obtain relief on their claims.
Some of the issues involved interest on judgments and awards of
23
24
expert fees, while others involved the timing of claims or the
25
Together these cases
extraterritorial application of Title VII.
represented a clear hostility to the interests of plaintiffs—a hostility
that became particularly apparent when seen in connection with a
series of nonemployment discrimination cases decided at the same
time that reflected a broader hostility to civil rights claims,
26
particularly in the area of affirmative action. When we turn to an
21. The Court has explicitly made this connection. See Wards Cove, 490
U.S. at 653; Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988). For
a discussion regarding how affirmative action is frequently linked with
disparate impact claims, see Mary C. Daly, Affirmative Action, Equal Access
and the Supreme Court’s 1988 Term: The Rehnquist Court Takes a Sharp Turn
to the Right, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1057, 1080–81 (1990).
22. See Susan F. Rasky, Rights Groups Work on Measure to Reverse Court’s
Bias Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1989, at 11.
23. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S 83, 84 (1991)
(restricting expert witness fees), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991
§ 113; Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 311 (1986), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 114.
24. Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 911–12 (1989) (holding that
a seniority system could be challenged as discriminatory only when it was first
adopted rather than when it became applicable), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991 § 112.
25. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 246 (1991), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109.
26. In the same term as Wilks, Patterson, and Wards Cove, the Supreme
Court applied strict scrutiny to review and strike down a set-aside program in
the city of Richmond, the former capital of the Confederacy. See City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493, 511 (1989). That same term, in
a rather extraordinary showing, the Court decided five other notable cases, all
of which went against the plaintiffs. See Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts,
492 U.S. 158, 168–69 (1989) (holding that a disability plan adopted prior to
passage of the ADEA could not be considered a subterfuge for discrimination);
Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 766 (1989) (holding
that no attorneys’ fees would be granted against losing intervenors); Jett v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 731 (1989) (holding that § 1983 provided
the exclusive remedy for rights violations by state governmental actors); Will v.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that the State is not
a person under § 1983); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489
U.S. 189, 202 (1989) (finding the State not liable under § 1983 for failing to
protect a child from abuse).
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assessment of the effects of the CRA, it is important to keep these
smaller cases in mind, as in the 1980s no case seemed too small for
the Court to side with employers.
Once the legislation began to move through Congress, several
obstacles became apparent. With President George H.W. Bush in
office, the Democratically controlled Senate had to secure the votes
necessary to overcome a presidential veto. Many of the proposed
provisions were uncontroversial, and there was also widespread
agreement that Title VII plaintiffs should be afforded jury trials
27
with damages available. At the same time, a group of Republican
Senators were intent on making the bill part of a larger tort-reform
effort and therefore sought to place caps on the damages
28
Among some in Congress, there was a sense that
provisions.
capping the damages in Title VII cases would lead to damage caps in
other federal statutes, although efforts to impose broader tort
29
reform stalled shortly after the passage of the CRA.
The most controversial part of the legislation was the provision
designed to overturn the Wards Cove decision. As I have argued
elsewhere, the disparate impact theory has always rested uneasily
within antidiscrimination law and it has likewise always been
equated with affirmative action, an issue that was particularly
30
The Supreme Court, and politicians, had
divisive at the time.
cautioned against aggressive interpretations of the disparate impact
law for fear that employers would be forced to adopt quotas as a way
31
to avoid lawsuits. This always seemed mostly a specious argument
given that the disparate impact theory had been in existence since
1971, with reasonably aggressive interpretations in the 1970s,
32
In any
without any hint of broadscale quota-motivated hiring.
event, the rhetoric proved powerful and the disparate impact
provisions became hotly contested and produced a series of
innovative legislative provisions.
Within the Senate, a debate broke out regarding whether Wards
27. M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environments and
Summary Judgments, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 311, 325 (1999).
28. In an op-ed defending the President’s signing of the bill, White House
Counsel C. Boyden Gray made the connection explicit. See C. Boyden Gray,
Civil Rights: We Won, They Capitulated, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1991, at A23
(noting that the damages provisions in the CRA [set] “an important precedent
for tort reform”).
29. 137 CONG. REC. 30,693 (Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Chester
Atkins).
30. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53
UCLA L. REV. 701, 706, 763–67 (2006).
31. Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why
Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1487, 1489–90 (1996); see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.
977, 993 (1988); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449 (1975).
32. For a strong refutation of the argument, see generally Ayres &
Siegelman, supra note 31.

W07_SELMI

4/15/2011 11:24:08 AM

Cove was truly a departure from past precedent, eventually leading
to dueling legislative memoranda that were written primarily by
33
At least in this particular instance, Justice
interest groups.
Scalia’s theory of statutory interpretation was given full credence, as
the memoranda were naked attempts to influence how the statute
should be interpreted almost entirely independent of the legislators
themselves, though not independent of their staffs, which had been
34
deeply involved in the process. As a result, the Senate inserted a
most peculiar provision into the statute forbidding courts from
35
looking to the legislative history. The Wards Cove company also
got its hands in the legislative cookie jar, as it was worried that the
legislative fix might undo its ten-year victory, and the company
eventually purchased its own statutory provision that exempted the
36
Wards Cove case from the legislation.
Despite all of the legislative maneuvering, the controversy
refused to die, and President Bush vetoed the Civil Rights Act of
37
1990 due to the disparate impact provision. Congress failed in its
override attempt but immediately set out to craft a new bill,
although the prospects for passage remained dim until the Clarence
38
Thomas hearings intervened. While Congress was debating what
was then known as the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Anita Hill’s
allegations of sexual harassment surfaced, which led to a public
debate over the emerging sexual harassment doctrine. Those
33. See Nathan Oman, Statutory Interpretation in Econotopia, 25 PACE L.
REV. 49, 68 (2004).
34. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 289 & n.39 (1989); Oman, supra note 33, at 68.
35. Section 105(b) of the CRA reads:
No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at
Vol. 137 Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall
be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as
legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act
that relates to Wards Cove—Business necessity/cumulation
/alternative business practice.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)).
36. The very last provision of the Act, section 402(b), states: “Certain
Disparate Impact Cases.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act,
nothing in this Act shall apply to any disparate impact case for which a
complaint was filed before March 1, 1975, and for which an initial decision was
rendered after October 30, 1983.” Id. § 402(b). It was generally understood
that the Wards Cove case was the only case that satisfied this definition. See
Stewart Kwoh, Congress Votes a Cure for All but the Victims, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
19, 1991, at B37 (noting that the company paid lobbyists more than $175,000 to
secure the unusual provision).
37. See Steven A. Holmes, President Vetoes Bill on Job Rights; Showdown
Is Set, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1990, at A1.
38. Initial efforts to override the veto failed by one vote in the Senate. See
Neil A. Lewis, President’s Veto of Rights Measure Survives by 1 Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 1990, at A1. A new bill was later introduced with some
modifications.
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hearings ultimately contributed to the passage of the CRA; indeed, I
think it is fair to say that without the hearings, there may not have
39
been a CRA. There were two reasons for this connection. First,
Missouri Senator John Danforth was both a Republican sponsor of
the CRA and the shepherd for Clarence Thomas, who had worked
for the Senator many years earlier in the Missouri Attorney
40
After the Anita Hill allegations arose, Senator
General’s office.
Danforth pledged to ensure Thomas’s nomination and the passage of
41
the CRA—a pledge he ultimately lived up to.
Second, and sometimes lost in the story, was the realization
during the hearings that victims of sexual harassment were often
left without any meaningful remedy. Not only did civil rights
advocates have Justice Thomas to thank for the passage of the CRA,
Judge Daniel Manion from the Seventh Circuit also chipped in with
42
his own contribution. In a case involving clear and uncontested
sexual harassment, Diane Swanson had been denied any relief since
43
she did not lose her job and therefore did not suffer monetary loss.
Not content to simply deny her relief, the Seventh Circuit went on to
conclude that because she was not eligible for any relief, she had no
claim and therefore was responsible for the defendant’s court costs,
44
which were taken directly out of her paycheck.
As noted at the outset, the CRA overturned parts or all of eight
Supreme Court decisions, and it added important new remedial
45
Equally important, the CRA sent a
provisions to the statute.
strong signal that Congress believed the Court was interpreting
Title VII too narrowly, and there was language to this effect
46
included in the statutory preface. The debate over the Act occurred
in a very public forum over the course of two years and tainted the
arrival of the Court’s newest member. All of this is to suggest that it
39. Other scholars have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Jerome
McCristal Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights
Act: The “Impossibility” of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 965
(1993) (giving primacy to the role of the Thomas hearings in the passage of the
CRA); Devins, supra note 15, at 996 (emphasizing the importance of the
Thomas hearings and of David Duke’s run for governor of Louisiana to the
passage of the CRA).
40. See Linda P. Campbell, GOP’s Danforth Faces a Political Maelstrom:
Senator Must Play 2 Roles with Bush, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 1991, § 1, at 19.
41. See Helen Dewar, White House, Senate Agree on Civil Rights Bill
Revisions, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1991, at A1, A8.
42. See Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1240
(7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Bohen v. City of E. Chi., 799 F.2d 1180, 1184 (7th Cir.
1986) (“If Congress wishes to amend the provisions of Title VII to provide a
remedy of damages, it can do so.”)).
43. Id.
44. See Judith Lichtman, The Labor Force Needs the 1990 Civil Rights Act,
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), May 31, 1990, at 69.
45. See supra note 1.
46. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071,
1071.
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would have been difficult for the Supreme Court to ignore the
message behind the CRA, but it was less clear whether the Act
would have its intended effect. Some of the provisions were
effectively self-executing: the interest and attorney’s fees provisions
allowed for little judicial interpretation, and the provision designed
to overturn Martin v. Wilks also turned out to be a clear directive
that produced no meaningful subsequent litigation. But the real
question was whether the Supreme Court would take Congress’s
broader message seriously and interpret Title VII with an eye
toward fulfilling the underlying purpose of the CRA rather than
with an eye toward protecting employers.
The message sent by—as opposed to the substantive provisions
of—the 1991 Act raises important questions about the relationship
between Congress and the Court. Here Congress was not only
reversing specific decisions but was also seeking to change the
Court’s interpretive direction.
Congress’s oversight powers,
however, are limited; Congress could always pass new legislation to
change or modify Supreme Court decisions, but short of new
legislation the Court is largely free to ignore congressional
directives. Suggesting that the Court is free to ignore congressional
directives assumes that the Court may have its own interests or
preferences in mind in interpreting statutes. Most scholars who
concentrate on statutory interpretation assume that a court’s
judicial duty is to interpret the statute consistent with congressional
intent, with the primary area of contention being what Congress
47
Positive political theorists, on the other hand, treat
intended.
courts as political actors who desire to implement their own
preferences; these theorists typically see modes of statutory
48
Numerous
interpretation as rhetorical, rather than restraining.
empirical scholars have also documented that courts frequently
49
decide cases based on judges’ presumed ideological preferences.
47. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalism of
Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117 (2009); Lawrence M. Solan, Private
Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory
Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427 (2005).
48. The literature on positive political theory is now extensive, but a good
summary can be found in McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory
of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631 (1995). For a
recent literature review, see Michael Abramowicz & Emerson H. Tiller, Citation
to Legislative History: Empirical Evidence on Positive Political and Contextual
Theories of Judicial Decisionmaking, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 419 (2009).
49. There is now an extensive empirical literature on judicial decisions,
most of which reveals that judges’ political ideology has a statistically
significant effect on their decisions. It is generally the case that political
ideology is not determinative in most cases but is clearly significant. For
several recent discussions of the literature, and some critiques, see CASS R.
SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? (2006); William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, Rational Behavior: A Statistical Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775
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For a conservative court, when it comes to issues of employment
discrimination, those preferences are most likely to include
insulating employers from liability, and as we have just seen, that
was how the pre-CRA Court proceeded.
Yet the Court was ultimately unsuccessful, and within the
positive political theory framework, a court that wants to implement
its preferences must avoid having its decisions overturned. As a
strategic matter, this can lead to some complex analysis, as the
Supreme Court would be primarily concerned not with the Congress
that enacted a statute but with the current Congress that would be
responsible for passing any new legislation, and, similarly, with the
50
Under this guise, the
President who might veto the legislation.
Court clearly played the game poorly in its discrimination decisions
of the late 1980s, since those decisions all had a very short shelf life.
In light of the CRA’s repudiation of those decisions, we might expect
the Supreme Court to change its game plan. As we will see, that is
precisely what it did—and it did so in a strategic way that has
protected most of the decisions the Court seems to care most about.
II. THE POST-1991 ACT CASES
This Part will assess the Supreme Court’s behavior following
the passage of the CRA in 1991 and will demonstrate that the Court
has acted as positive political theory would predict. Apparently
chastened by the CRA rebuke, the Court has proceeded more wisely,
ruling for plaintiffs in the majority of cases, often unanimously,
while siding with the interests of employers in the cases that matter
most. During this time period, from 1993 to 2009, the Court’s
composition has changed but it has remained a fundamentally
conservative Court, one that arguably is more conservative than the
51
It is
Court that issued the decisions that led to the CRA.
(2009); and Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project:
Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court
Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004). Although the empirical
approach has now migrated to law schools, much of the work is concentrated in
political science. For a work coauthored by a leading contributor in the field,
see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
50. See John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of
Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 263, 270 (1992) (noting that
“the preference configuration of the current legislature is far more important for
the results of statutory interpretation than is that of the enacting legislature”).
51. Justice Alito is more conservative than the Justice he replaced—Justice
O’Connor—and this is particularly true on employment discrimination issues.
Chief Justice Roberts is also more conservative than was Chief Justice
Rehnquist. Perhaps most significantly, Justice Clarence Thomas, who joined
the Court in 1991, is undeniably far more conservative than Justice Thurgood
Marshall. Justice Kennedy, who joined the Court in 1988, has also solidified his
foothold in the conservative wing of the Court on many issues. On the other
side, Justice Ginsburg is more liberal than the Justice she replaced—Justice
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important, however, to highlight the Court’s process—many of the
cases the Court has adjudicated over the last two decades have
raised rather minor issues, and a surprising number of cases were
simply necessary to reverse plainly incorrect lower court cases. In
these minor cases, the plaintiffs have uniformly prevailed. But
there were also a handful of controversial and important cases, and
in those cases the defendants have prevailed, suggesting that the
Court was still willing to implement its preferences, at the risk of
reversal, in the cases of greatest significance. Finally, there were
cases addressing issues of intermediate importance in which the
plaintiffs fared well, and it is in this handful of cases that the Court
likely exercised the most judicial restraint.
Before discussing the cases, I must address several preliminary
matters. As noted previously, I have excluded disability cases from
the analysis, primarily because the CRA was not aimed at the
disability statute. The Court unquestionably interpreted the ADA
narrowly, and Congress recently passed legislation intended to
52
modify the Court’s approach in several of the cases; it will be
interesting to see how the Court responds, and if the CRA offers any
guidance to the Court’s likely reaction to the statutory repudiation.
I have also excluded most of the cases that involve arbitration
agreements since the cases have primarily involved interpretation of
53
a different statute—the Federal Arbitration Act —or issues not
54
directly related to discrimination claims. I have, however, included
the several cases that directly involve discrimination issues.
Finally, I should note that classifying several of the cases has
required subjective determinations as to who prevailed in a case,
and also as to whom the doctrine is most likely to benefit. I will
highlight where I have made such judgments.
Immediately following the passage of the CRA, the Supreme
Court appeared to be up to its old tricks. The first two cases the
Supreme Court addressed involved the retroactivity of the statute—
specifically, whether the CRA applied to cases that were pending at
55
the time of enactment. In both cases, the Court held that the CRA
White—and when Justice Souter replaced Justice Brennan in 1990, he was
more conservative but drifted consistently to the left thereafter.
52. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
53. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2006).
54. For example, I have excluded Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532
U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act’s exemption for
employment of transportation workers), but included EEOC v. Waffle House,
Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 282 (2002) (holding that an agreement between employer
and employee to arbitrate employment-related disputes does not bar the EEOC
from seeking victim-related damages) and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (upholding compulsory arbitration agreement for
claims arising under the ADEA).
55. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 300 (1994) (holding
that § 1981 does not apply retroactively); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S.
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did not apply retroactively but instead only applied to controversies
56
that arose after it was passed.
This effectively delayed
implementation for several years. Notably, however, both decisions
were written by Justice Stevens with Justice Blackmun as the lone
dissenter, and there was substantial support for the Court’s decision
both in the legislative history, which was purposefully left
unresolved, and in the body of law that had developed regarding the
57
retroactive application of legislation. The Court also decided the
controversial St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks case after the CRA
was passed, but the case itself had little to do with the statute even
though the Court’s decision made it more difficult for plaintiffs to
58
prevail in certain cases. Yet if we view Hicks as part of the postCRA history, the Court’s treatment is consistent with the pattern we
observe in other cases—namely, that the most significant cases
remain solidly in the defendants’ camp.
After Hicks, the Court heard a series of cases in which plaintiffs
prevailed, often through unanimous decisions. In Appendix A, I
provide a list of the cases decided since the CRA was passed, noting
the party that prevailed, the year the case was decided, and the
Supreme Court vote breakdown. The results are revealing: the
Supreme Court decided forty-three cases in connection with Title
VII, the ADEA, and § 1981, and in twenty-nine, or 67.4%, of those
decisions found in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendants prevailed
59
Of the forty-three decisions,
in thirteen, or 30.2%, of the cases.
twenty were unanimous, 46.5% of the total, and, remarkably,
eighteen of the unanimous decisions were in favor of plaintiffs.
Indeed, nearly two thirds (62.1%) of the decisions favoring plaintiffs
60
were unanimous.

244, 247 (1994) (holding that amendments to Title VII do not apply
retroactively).
56. Rivers, 511 U.S. at 300; Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 247.
57. These cases resonated personally with me since I had spent a
significant amount of time arguing that the CRA did apply retroactively and
was the lead appellate counsel on a case in which the argument was successful
(a case in which I prevailed over one of my now colleagues). See Estate of
Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470, 471 (9th Cir. 1993).
58. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1993) (holding
that proof of pretext may, but need not, lead to a finding of discrimination). The
effects of the Hicks case were muted by the introduction of jury trials as part of
the CRA. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(c), 105 Stat. 1071,
1072. The Court’s holding in Hicks has less relevance to a jury than to a judge,
and has been particularly important at the summary judgment stage.
59. One of the cases was functionally a tie, as neither party’s position was
adopted. See Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 387–88
(2008) (holding that so-called me-too evidence was subject to general evidence
standards of relevancy rather than to any automatic rule).
60. See Table 1, infra.
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TABLE 1: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES DECIDED 1993–2010
Decision
Prevail
Unanimous
5–4

Plaintiff
29
18
1

Defendant
13
2
5

The high number of unanimous decisions in favor of plaintiffs
offers a sharp contrast to the Court’s decisions rendered prior to the
CRA. During the period 1986–1989, there were five unanimous
decisions and all but one had a significant concurring opinion
61
Interestingly, none of the
supporting a more limited approach.
unanimous decisions were issued during 1989, when the Court was
62
In terms of
most active in limiting the scope of Title VII.
substance, only one of the unanimous cases involved race
discrimination, while three involved important issues relating to sex
discrimination. In contrast, the cases that most clearly prompted
the CRA—Patterson, Wilks, and, to an extent, Wards Cove—all
involved issues of race discrimination, as was true for most of the
controversial affirmative action cases that arose during this time
63
period.

61. For a breakdown of the decisions, see Table 2, infra. The only decision
without some qualification was St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraj, 481 US. 604,
613 (1987), which defined § 1981 to include national origin claims. The other
cases all had some limitations. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479
U.S. 272, 272–73 (1987) (holding, in an opinion by a fractured Court, that a
leave policy that offered preferential treatment for women and exceeded the
federal standards for pregnancy nondiscrimination was permissible); Bazemore
v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400, 407–10 (1986) (handing down a unanimous
decision on the relevance of regression analysis but a split decision on the
public-accommodations provision); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
66, 72 (1986) (handing down a unanimous decision on the permissibility of the
hostile-work-environment theory but withholding judgment on the scope of
liability).
62. See Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197, 212–13
(1991) (analyzing a fetal-protection policy as facially discriminatory with a
concurring opinion suggesting that the possibility of third-party lawsuits might
constitute adequate justification for the policy); Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S.
182, 189 (1990) (permitting the EEOC to obtain information relating to a tenure
decision).
63. Only one of the cases overturned or modified by the CRA substantively
involved sex discrimination. Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 105
Stat. 1071, 1078–79.
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Table 2: Employment Discrimination Cases Decided 1987–1991
Decision
Prevail
Unanimous
5–4
6–3

Plaintiff
10
5
1
2

Defendant
12
0
3
4

The substantial rise in unanimous decisions not only represents
a change in course for the Supreme Court but also highlights an
important issue embedded in these cases—namely, just how
conservative some of the lower courts have become. Perhaps more
accurately, the cases indicate how much more conservative some of
the lower courts are compared to what is generally viewed as a very
conservative Supreme Court. While it is difficult to draw any
conclusions based on this small sample, it is worth noting that of the
eighteen unanimous decisions, eleven originated from the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, with the Sixth leading the way with five
unanimous reversals. Only one of the unanimous decisions was an
outright affirmance, and that was the mixed-motives case Desert
64
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, which arose out of the Ninth Circuit, often
considered the most liberal appellate court. Some of the cases
involved appellate decisions that were clearly outliers and were
essentially summarily reversed. For example, the Fourth Circuit
held that to establish a prima facie age discrimination claim, an
individual had to demonstrate that she had been replaced by
someone outside of the protected class, a holding that had no
support in the statutory language and that the Supreme Court
65
reversed in a seven-paragraph opinion. The same court also held
that former employees could not bring Title VII claims, excising
66
from the statute anyone who was no longer employed. This latter
case had some resemblance to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Patterson—as both cases involved the scope of the statute—and
suggests that the Supreme Court may have taken seriously
Congress’s directive to interpret the statutes consistently with their
underlying purposes.
Perhaps the most interesting of the unanimous decisions
reversing a hostile lower court was a case that involved racial
epithets. In Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals had held that the use of “boy,” when directed at an African
American man, was not evidence of discriminatory intent unless it

64. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
65. See O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996), rev’g
56 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 1995).
66. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc),
rev’d, 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
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67

was qualified by a racial term such as “black.” In a per curiam
rebuke, the Supreme Court rejected the need for the racial qualifier,
noting that whether the term was evidence of discrimination should
be considered within its context and in conjunction with additional
68
evidence the plaintiff produced. In the same case, the Court also
rejected the appellate court’s standard—that pretext could only be
established by comparison to the employer’s treatment of others to
the extent the “disparity in qualifications is so apparent as virtually
69
Despite the
to jump off the page and slap you in the face.”
Supreme Court’s sound rejection, the Eleventh Circuit recently
reaffirmed a dismissal of the case, albeit under slightly different
70
legal standards.
Another noteworthy aspect of the unanimous cases is that most
of the cases were of minor significance. Several had to do with
procedural issues that had not been resolved in the thirty-year
history of Title VII, such as the requirements for verifying a
complaint and the method for counting employees to meet the
71
statutory coverage requirement. The Supreme Court decided only
two cases during the Wards Cove era that presented similar
72
interpretive questions, and in these and other cases, the Court has
recently taken a pragmatic rather than literal linguistic approach.
This was true in the Court’s definition of “employee” and its
determination that the number of employees is not a jurisdictional
issue, even though there were substantial arguments in support of
73
the other side on both issues. In the earlier era, it seems quite
likely that the Court would have ruled differently, or, more likely,
74
allowed the lower court decisions to stand without review.
67. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. App’x 529, 533 (11th Cir. 2005),
rev’d, 546 U.S. 454 (2006).
68. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006).
69. Id. at 456–57 (quoting Ash, 129 F. App’x at 533 (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
70. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 392 F. App’x 817 (11th Cir. 2010).
71. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006) (determining that
employee numerosity is not a jurisdictional issue); Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll.,
535 U.S. 106 (2002) (upholding an EEOC regulation allowing for post-charge
verification); Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 212 (1997)
(adopting the payroll method for counting employees).
72. See Stevens v. Dep’t of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 6 (1991) (requiring an
employee to file a notice of intent to sue with the EEOC within 180 days of the
discriminatory act and at least 30 days before filing suit); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755, 764 (1989) (permitting challenges to consent decrees by employees not
present at the time the decree was entered), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076–77.
73. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510–15.
74. If the Court were so inclined, it could have reached a different
conclusion in Arbaugh, which makes its unanimity all the more surprising.
Given that Title VII only applies to employers with fifteen or more employees,
permitting the statute to apply to a smaller employer, as appeared to be the
case in Arbaugh, seems to be a stretch. But the question the Court was likely
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Not all of the unanimous cases have turned on minor issues.
75
The Court held that Title VII prohibits same-sex harassment, an
issue that had caused considerable havoc in the lower courts; tossed
76
aside any remnant of the pretext-plus issue; and in two cases,
77
crafted quite liberal principles of law relating to retaliation claims.
Indeed, if there has been any major and surprising turn of events, it
has been the Supreme Court’s protective approach to retaliation
claims. Plaintiffs have prevailed in all five retaliation claims the
Court has considered, and the Court has adopted an expansive
interpretation of the statute in each case. In one of the cases, the
Court had to identify a retaliation claim when the statute was
78
These cases
arguably silent or at best ambiguous on the issue.
have helped spark a sharp rise in retaliation claims, but despite that
increase, the Court has not sought to cut back on its broad
interpretations, and it is difficult to see the Court as anything other
79
than genuinely protective of retaliation claims.
asking itself is why this issue had not been raised earlier, and it probably
relented in the face of a completed trial. A similar pragmatic result was
reached in a case involving whether an EEOC intake form can constitute a
charge of discrimination. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389,
402–03 (2008). The Court affirmed an EEOC regulation permitting this
scenario, given that a different conclusion likely would have simply meant that
the person would have filed a charge much later to avoid penalizing the plaintiff
for the way the EEOC had handled the case. Id. at 406–07.
75. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)
(permitting same-sex harassment claims).
76. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148–49
(2000) (abrogating pretext-plus decisions by the lower courts).
77. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct.
846, 849 (2009) (holding that an individual who participates in an internal
proceeding can proceed on a retaliation claim); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67–68 (2006) (establishing a standard for a
retaliation claim when an employee would be discouraged from filing a claim).
78. In Gomez-Perez v. Potter, the Court read into the ADEA a retaliation
provision in an opinion by Justice Alito that drew dissents from Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474,
477–79 (2008). This case can likewise be seen as a purely pragmatic decision,
as there was little question that Congress would have inserted the standard
retaliation provision into the statute since this appeared to be little more than a
drafting error. See also Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 849; CBOCS W., Inc. v.
Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 445 (2008) (implying a retaliation cause of action in §
1981); Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68. The Burlington Northern case provides an
example of just how protective the Court has been, as the plaintiff prevailed in
the lower court on a stricter standard than the Supreme Court adopted. For a
discussion of the cases, see Michael Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court?
The Retaliation Decisions, 60 S.C. L. REV. 917, 917 n.2, 919–23 (2009).
79. Retaliation claims filed with the EEOC have increased from 21,613 in
Fiscal Year 2000 to 33,613 in Fiscal Year 2009. Charge Statistics, U.S. EEOC,
http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Apr. 8,
2011). This term the Court held that certain third-party retaliation claims
could be pursued under Title VII; in that particular case, the employer
appeared to retaliate against the employee’s fiancée. See Thompson v. N. Am.
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The plaintiff-friendly cases demonstrate that the Supreme
Court has moved in a direction that has been more protective of
victims of discrimination, but there is an important countertrend
that offers a clear balance and also suggests that the Court may be
playing a sophisticated political game. In the most significant
cases—including the sole employment case to touch on questions
80
relating to affirmative action —the defendants continue to prevail,
and often by five-to-four majorities. In these cases, the Court
continues to impose its preferences, but now does so while also
issuing a series of pro-plaintiff decisions, most of which likely do not
implicate clear preferences of the Court. There have been five
decisions in favor of defendants by a five-to-four margin, and at least
four of the cases are among the most significant decided since the
81
CRA. As noted previously, the Supreme Court began the post-CRA
era with a five-to-four decision in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,
in which it held that proof of pretext leads to a permissive inference
of discrimination rather than the mandatory presumption advocated
82
by the plaintiffs and adopted by the lower court. That decision also
kept alive the damaging pretext-plus theory, though only by
disingenuous lower court interpretations, which the Supreme Court
83
abrogated nearly a decade later.
More recently, the Supreme Court has issued several
controversial decisions favoring defendants. In Ricci v. DeStefano,
the conservative majority of the Court invalidated an employer’s
voluntary efforts to remedy the adverse impact of several promotion
84
tests it had administered. Reverting to its Wards Cove days, the
Court deemed the tests valid even though the tests had not been
subject to any legal scrutiny and despite strong arguments that the
85
tests could not be validated under existing law. The Ricci case has
Stainless, L.P., 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011). I should note that I did not include
Thompson in the statistical count, given that, as I write this, the term is not yet
completed and including only some of the cases might appear misleading. One
might define Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001), as a
loss for plaintiffs on a retaliation claim, but that case seems to be more about
pleading than about retaliation and was a unanimous per curiam decision. Id.
at 271, 274.
80. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2663–64 (2009).
81. See Table 3, infra.
82. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 523–24 (1993).
83. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148–49
(2000).
84. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
85. See id. at 2678 (“There is no genuine dispute that the examinations
were job-related and consistent with business necessity”). This statement
ignored the numerous objections that had been raised about the test, including
its limited utility for assessing skills relevant to higher-level positions and its
use as a rank-order device. Id. at 2707 n.16. It is my own sense that the tests
at issue in Ricci would have been very difficult to justify under existing
validation guidelines. The case has been the subject of extensive critical
commentary. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading
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drawn considerable attention and harkens back to the assault on
affirmative action from the 1980s, as the Court appeared to view the
city’s remedial action as akin to instituting racial preferences for the
86
minority firefighters. The following term, the Court also held that
the mixed-motives theory, often seen as a boon to plaintiffs, was not
available under the ADEA, even though the language at issue in the
ADEA was quite similar to the language in Title VII that permits
87
such claims. The difference in results between cases decided under
Title VII and the ADEA may be a sign that statutory language can,
in fact, restrain the Court. Although the Court announced a liberal
standard for Title VII claims based on language from the CRA, that
language did not apply to the ADEA, leaving the Court free to
implement its preference on age claims.
TABLE 3: FIVE-TO-FOUR DECISIONS: 1993–2010
St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
Kentucky Retirement Systems v. EEOC
Ricci v. DeStefano
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.

The other noteworthy five-to-four decision reveals that the
Court can still overplay its hand.
In the only employment
discrimination case to receive more attention than Ricci, the
Supreme Court held that Lilly Ledbetter had waited too long to file
88
There were, to be sure, some
her wage discrimination claim.
pragmatic aspects to the case that led the Court to side with the
employer. However, in doing so, the Court imposed a restrictive
standard that would have likely foreclosed most wage
discrimination claims since it can often take employees years to
learn that pay raises were issued in a discriminatory fashion. In her
89
dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg called on Congress to act, and
it quickly did so. Just over a year after the decision was issued, the
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (“Fair Pay Act”) became the first bill
President Barack Obama signed into law, thus reversing the
Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73
(2010).
86. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677. See generally Helen Norton, The Supreme
Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum Understanding of Equality, 52
WM. & MARY L. REV. 197 (2010); Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate
Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010).
87. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
88. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007),
superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2,
123 Stat. 5.
89. Id. at 661 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court’s decision and likely expanding the statute of
90
limitations beyond what had existed in most of the lower courts.
The case, and the subsequent Fair Pay Act, also drew attention to
the issue of pay equity in a way the Court likely did not intend, and
there is little question that to the extent the Court was seeking to
insulate employers from wage discrimination claims, its Ledbetter
91
Nevertheless, the
decision ultimately had the opposite effect.
unintended consequences may prove more theoretical than real, as
to date there has not been any significant increase in wage claims,
92
and a bill to address pay equity issues has failed to gain traction.
I should also note that rather than overplaying its hand, the
Supreme Court may have misjudged future election results. The
Ledbetter decision was issued toward the end of the Bush presidency
but before the Democrats took over the presidency and both houses
of Congress. It is certainly possible that had the decision been
issued the following year, the Court may have sought a more
moderate path, although its decision in the Ricci case may suggest
otherwise. There is, however, an important distinction between
those two cases: Ledbetter was purely a matter of statutory
interpretation and relatively easy to overturn, while Ricci
represented an amalgam of interpretations of past Supreme Court
precedent with overlays of constitutional considerations. The Ricci
case also involved race, whereas Ledbetter presented a more
appealing sex discrimination claim that was ripe for congressional
review.
In addition to the unanimous decisions for plaintiffs and the
five-to-four decisions for defendants, there was a series of cases
decided by various margins and also a set of cases in which it was
difficult to determine what party would ultimately come out ahead.
These latter cases included three in which the Court provided a

90. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). The Act
amends Title VII’s filing requirement for compensation cases so that an
employment practice occurs “when a discriminatory compensation decision or
other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an individual is
affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice, including each time wages, benefits or other compensation is paid.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A). That standard is potentially broader than any
standard that had existed in the lower courts.
91. Not only was the Act amended to overturn Ledbetter, but also another
bill has been introduced to address pay equity issues. See Paycheck Fairness
Act, S. 182, 111th Cong. (2009); Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 12, 111th Cong.
(2009).
92. The other five-to-four decision was a complicated age discrimination
case in which the defendant prevailed, but it would be difficult to characterize
the case as significantly disadvantaging older employees because the plan at
issue was unusual and the particular case was enmeshed in peculiar facts. See
Ky. Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 554 U.S. 135, 143–47 (2008).
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legal standard that was generally protective of plaintiff interests,
and then carved out an affirmative defense to encourage employers
93
to take precautionary measures. The Court first took this step in a
pair of sexual harassment cases in which it crafted an affirmative
defense out of thin air—but a defense that also seemed consistent
with the purpose behind the CRA, which is to prevent rather than
94
What is perhaps most revealing is that
remedy harassment.
although the language of the affirmative defense should make it
difficult for employers to proceed, lower courts have frequently
95
construed the defense more broadly so as to deny plaintiffs relief.
In another case—this one unanimous—the Supreme Court resolved
a long-standing split in the circuits by holding that the age
discrimination statute permitted disparate impact claims, while
creating a very loose standard for employers to justify their
96
practices.
Viewed in their entirety, the cases decided after 1991 reveal a
decidedly different Supreme Court from the one that prompted
passage of the CRA. The current Court seems more moderate and
less hostile to employment discrimination plaintiffs and remarkably
protective of the right to be free from retaliation, but at the same
time continues to implement its own preferences when it matters
the most. As a matter of positive political theory, the Court has
responded not with timidity but in a strategically sophisticated
fashion, and most of its decisions have remained in force. In other
words, the CRA provided a meaningful but not total restraint on the
93. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545–46 (1999) (adopting
an affirmative defense in connection with a punitive damages claim);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (adopting an
affirmative defense in sexual harassment cases); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998) (same).
94. As best I have been able to determine, the affirmative defense had not
previously been adopted by any court in a sexual harassment case, and it was
not presented in any of the briefs filed in the case. See generally Elizabeth M.
Brama, Note, The Changing Burden of Employer Liability for Workplace
Discrimination, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1481 (1999) (discussing prior case law). This
gives credence to Justice Thomas’s claim in dissent that the defense was made
up out of “whole cloth.” See Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 771 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
95. An early assessment demonstrated that lower courts were interpreting
the affirmative defense so that employers who acted appropriately were
generally immunized from liability, even if the defense did not technically
apply. See David Sherwyn et al., Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel Your
“1-800” Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the
Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1265, 1266, 1294 (2001).
96. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232, 239 (2005). In Smith,
the Supreme Court adopted a “reasonableness” standard based loosely on the
portion of the Wards Cove decision that had been overruled by the CRA; much
like in the Ricci case, the Court went on to uphold the City’s practice even
though the reasonableness of the practice had not been briefed or argued. Id. at
240–41.
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Court’s impulses.
III. THE 1991 ACT AND THE LOWER COURTS
Although the CRA appears to have restrained the Supreme
Court, it has had significantly less force in the lower courts. While I
will not go into great detail to demonstrate the hostility to
employment discrimination claims at the appellate level, I will
highlight three different indicators.
One has already been
discussed, and that is the number of cases in which the Supreme
Court unanimously reversed lower courts. In addition, appellate
courts have created a number of legal doctrines that make it more
difficult for plaintiffs to prove their cases. Many of the doctrines are
evidentiary in nature, but all of them make it more, rather than
less, difficult for plaintiffs to prevail. These doctrines include the
creation of a fourth element of the prima facie case that requires
plaintiffs (in some circuits) to prove that there is a similarly situated
individual who was treated differently, with strict requirements
governing who will satisfy the requirement; the stray remarks
97
Equally important, no
doctrine; and the same actor inference.
evidentiary rule or legal doctrine has arisen that favors plaintiffs,
with the possible exception of some of the emerging case law
98
regarding mixed-motives claims.
Perhaps the strongest indicator of the difficulty plaintiffs face in
lower courts is revealed by the many studies that have documented
low success rates both at trial and on appeal. In her Symposium
99
contribution, Professor Wendy Parker surveys the studies, and I
will only add a brief summary of my own. The various studies are
all consistent in their findings—more employment discrimination
cases go to trial than do other kinds of cases, but plaintiffs typically
have a lower success rate. Plaintiffs succeed in somewhere between
35–40% of their cases tried before a jury, with a significantly lower
100
success rate before a judge. Even though most cases are now tried
97. These doctrines are all discussed in DIANNE AVERY ET AL., EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 124–32 (8th ed. 2010).
98. See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir.
2004) (adopting a modified standard for summary judgment purposes).
Although the mixed-motives theory has drawn considerable interest among
academics, and can be a useful theory at the summary judgment stage, the
limited remedies available under the theory render it less useful at trial.
99. See generally Wendy Parker, Juries, Race, and Gender: A Story of
Today’s Inequality, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 192–99 (2011).
100. Id. at 195–96. In charting the win rates for plaintiffs from 1990–2001,
Professors Laura Beth Nielson and Robert L. Nelson demonstrated a success
rate that ranged from a low of 35.8% (1996) to a high of 43.6% (1992), with an
average of 40%. See Laura Beth Nielson & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized?:
An Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming
System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663, 699 tbl.4.A. The success rates in bench trials
were typically one half that of those in cases tried to juries, with the notable
exception of 2001, when plaintiffs prevailed in one third of their bench trials.
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before juries, this latter finding is important because judges handle
the pre- and post-trial motions, and plaintiffs tend to have a low
101
The data
success rate in defending summary judgment motions.
also demonstrate that employment discrimination plaintiffs fare
102
worse than other civil plaintiffs both at trial and on appeal.
It might be that the lower success rates reflect weaker cases,
but it is not at all clear why this might be so. There is no clear
reason why employees would file weaker cases, particularly given
the filtering process that requires individuals to first proceed
103
through the federal EEOC or the state analogue. While there may
be a higher number of pro se plaintiffs, the absolute number
104
remains very small, and very few ever get to trial. The settlement
105
values are also typically modest, so these cases should not be
particularly attractive to profit-motivated attorneys, though the
availability of attorney’s fees might be an additional incentive.
Nevertheless, if the monetary value is not the inducement, the
prospect of success surely should be, and again, unless the cases
were worth significantly more, attorneys should have the same
incentives to bring strong employment discrimination claims as they
106
It also strikes me as problematic
would to bring other civil cases.
to assume it is the cases rather than the judges that drive the
disparate results—it seems to me the burden should be on
explaining what those differences might be rather than simply
suggesting employment discrimination cases are less meritorious.
Indeed, the “blame the cases” mentality—which arises in most
presentations of the data—mirrors the judicial hostility to
Id.
101. The difficulty plaintiffs encounter on summary judgment has been well
and repeatedly documented. For two recent analyses, see Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010), and Elizabeth Schneider, The Dangers of Summary
Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705 (2007).
102. See Kevin Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 429,
455 fig.12 (2004). The difference varies, but for both 1995 and 2001, plaintiffs
had a 5% differential at trial, with similar differences on appeal. Id. at 441
fig.7.
103. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006); Laura Beth
Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment
Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL
L. STUD. 175, 177 (2010).
104. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 102, at 434 tbl.1, 440.
105. Nielsen et al., supra note 103, at 188.
106. I have commented on these issues previously. See Michael Selmi, Why
Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Difficult to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555,
570 (2001). For an interesting alternative explanation for appellate court
hostility that focuses on judicial workload, see Lee Reeves, Pragmatism over
Politics: Recent Trends in Lower Court Employment Discrimination
Jurisprudence, 73 MO. L. REV. 481, 512–22 (2008).
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employment discrimination cases.
Although it may come as a surprise to some that in the context
of employment discrimination cases the lower courts now appear to
be more conservative than the Supreme Court, this is less of a
surprise within the positive political theory framework.
Congressional action is almost always aimed at the Supreme Court
rather than lower courts, and as a result, Congress poses less of a
threat to the lower courts. Instead, the Supreme Court plays the
primary restraining role on the appellate courts, and it may be that
the chance of review and reversal is so low as to pose only a limited
constraint. At the same time, the prospect of congressional reversal
also seems quite low, and it is not clear why one would pose a
greater restraint than the other. It may be that the difference lies
in the assumptions behind the process: Supreme Court review is a
normal part of the appellate process, whereas congressional action is
an extraordinary and public process that typically is directed at
cases of greater magnitude.
Whatever the reason, the problem for plaintiffs pursuing
employment discrimination claims lies primarily in the lower courts
rather than in the Supreme Court; this also makes the prospect for
meaningful change more complicated since congressional action is
less likely to reshape judicial approaches in the appellate courts.
The Supreme Court might be able to prompt change, but, outside of
a handful of aberrational cases, that does not seem to be the Court’s
interest. I think there is little question that the current Supreme
Court remains fundamentally conservative and is not likely to have
a preference for greater plaintiff success in the lower courts.
CONCLUSION
The CRA not only reversed a series of decisions but also
prompted the Supreme Court to change its interpretive position.
Plaintiffs have fared considerably better in the last two decades
than they did in the period immediately preceding the passage of
the CRA. But the Supreme Court has clearly not entirely relented,
as it continues to reach conservative results in the cases in which it
appears to have the strongest preferences. Close decisions continue
to trend for defendants without much variation, whereas the
decisions that side with plaintiffs are now most commonly
unanimous, and often short, decisions. Yet, as noted, the real
obstacles for plaintiffs have simply moved to the appellate courts, in
which plaintiffs now continually face hostile forums, ones that the
Supreme Court is generally willing to accept and that avoid the
glare of Congress. So while the Supreme Court has become a more
favorable forum for employment discrimination plaintiffs, conditions
on the whole have not significantly improved.
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APPENDIX A
Case

Outcome

Margin

Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)

Pl.

9-0

McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995)

Pl.

9-0

O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996)

Pl.

9-0

Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202 (1997)

Pl.

9-0

Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337 (1997)

Pl.

9-0

Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422 (1998)

Pl.

6-3

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)

Pl.

9-0

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)

Pl.

7-2

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)

Pl.

7-2

West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212 (1999)

Pl.

5-4

Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999)

Pl.

9-0 & 5-4

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000)

Pl.

9-0

Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001)

Pl.

9-0

EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002)

Pl.

6-3

Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106 (2002)

Pl.

9-0

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002)

Pl.

9-0 & 5-4

Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2002)

Pl.

7-2

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003)

Pl.

9-0

Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004)

Pl.

9-0

Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005)

Pl.

9-0

Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (2006)

Pl.

9-0

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006)

Pl.

8-0

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)

Pl.

9-0

Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389 (2008)

Pl.

7-2

CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008)

Pl.

7-2

Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008)

Pl.

6-3

Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84 (2008)

Pl.

9-0

Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009)

Pl.

9-0

Lewis v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010)

Pl.

9-0

Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379 (2008)

None

9-0

Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993)

Def.

9-0

St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)

Def.

5-4

Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994)

Def.

8-1

Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994)

Def.

8-1

Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995)

Def.

6-3

Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001)

Def.

9-0

Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004)

Def.

6-3

Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004)

Def.

8-1

Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)

Def.

5-4

Ky. Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 554 U.S. 135 (2008)

Def.

5-4

AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962 (2009)

Def.

7-2

Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009)

Def.

5-4

Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009)

Def.

5-4
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APPENDIX B
Case

Outcome

Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987)

Pl.

Margin
6-3

United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987)

Pl.

5-4

Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987)

Pl.

6-3

St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraj, 481 U.S. 604 (1987)

Pl.

9-0

Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987)

Def.

6-3

EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107 (1988)

Pl.

6-3

Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988)

Pl.

9-0

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)

Def.

6-3

Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)

Def.

5-4

Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989)

Def.

5-4

Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989)

Def.

5-3

Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)

Def.

5-4

Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989)

Def.

6-2

Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989)

Def.

7-2

Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990)

Pl.

9-0

W. Va. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991)

Def.

6-3

Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991)

Pl.

9-0

EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991)

Def.

6-3

Stevens v. Dep’t of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1 (1991)

Pl.

8-1

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)

Def.

7-2

Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991)

Pl.

9-0

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)

Def.

6-3

